The Limits of Globalization and Hegemony

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BETWEEN THE END of the American Civil War in 1865 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the first great period of human globalization brought the world together as never before. Technologies like the railroad, the telegraph, the airplane, and the internal combustion engine led many optimistic observers to predict the end of large-scale war. We often hear similar arguments today. Are they as wrong now as they were then?

On the eve of that era’s violent destruction, Norman Angell predicted in his best-selling book The Great Illusion that commerce among Europe’s great powers had finally rendered war obsolete. Angell declared that it was economically irrational for any European power to upset the global economy through continental conquest. He argued that the gains of conquest were substantially outweighed by the costs of war. Economically speaking, he was undoubtedly correct. He was also irrelevant. In less than a year, the guns of August shattered his vision and the First World War mired Europe in four years of hell on earth. However economically detrimental it may have been, war was not obsolete.

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