How to Deal with Pakistan

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Later this month, President Obama will decide the size and scope of the drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. July 2011 marks the beginning of a process that should ultimately result in the complete transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans by 2014. Although the American public has grown tired of the ten-year-long war, a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll indicates that 43 percent of Americans say the war is worth fighting, compared to just 31 percent in March. Even with the recent successes in the south, where a counterinsurgency campaign has targeted the Quetta Shura Taliban, there is still much that remains to be done. Perhaps most significantly, Washington needs to wean its Pakistani ally off its relationship with insurgent groups that straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

Popular opinion holds that the U.S. and coalition forces cannot succeed in Afghanistan as long as Pakistan continues to support militant groups sheltering, training, and plotting in the sprawling tribal regions. For years, the U.S. has begged, bribed, and cajoled influential Pakistani leadership to sever their ties to insurgents. And yet these groups continue to be supported by current and retired elements of Pakistan’s military and security services such as the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a policy that has approval at the highest levels of the Pakistani security establishment. The only way to convince Pakistan to break with its insurgent proxies is by defeating them on the battlefield in Afghanistan.

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