When the Time Bomb Doesn’t Tick

In 2014, a former senior interrogator with the CIA’s High Value Detainee interrogation program drafted an article on “the ticking time bomb scenario” and interrogating terrorists. The article was approved by the CIA’s Publication Review Board but given the time that lapsed in getting approval, it was never published. The events in Brussels this week make the subject matter highly relevant and we believe the article makes an important contribution to the critical international debate about securing populations from jihadist terror.

Salah Abdeslam was one of the key planners of the terrorist attacks in Paris, France, on November 13, 2015. He was detained in Brussels last Friday after an intense four-month search and his capture was greeted with great relief and even optimism. “It is of the utmost importance that Abdeslam was captured alive, because we can now try to reconstruct the entire scenario,” Belgian state security chief Jaak Raes told a Belgian television network over the weekend. Abdeslam’s attorney, Sven Mary, told news outlets that his client was “worth his weight in gold” because he was cooperating with authorities, who were keen to learn about possible planning of additional attacks in Europe. “He is not maintaining his right to remain silent.” Belgian authorities were monitoring a network of radical Islamists in Brussels who were thought to be providing logistical support to Abdeslam and, they feared, plotting new attacks. “We know that a number of people are possibly on their way to Western Europe, with the intention of conducting an attack,” said Raes. “We need to stay very vigilant about that.”

On Tuesday, jihadists with ties to Abdeslam’s network conducted twin attacks in Brussels, killing 31 and injuring 270. We don’t know what, if anything, Abdeslam told authorities under questioning. But it’s clear that he did not provide information that would have allowed Belgian security forces to prevent the attacks in Brussels.

Here is the Beale piece:

We’ve all heard it. Somewhere amid the din and clamor of a cable news interview or argument regarding the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program, one or more of the participants will inevitably offer some version of the following: “I can see the president authorizing their use in a ticking time-bomb scenario – when there’s an imminent attack on a big city like New York or Chicago and the guy has information which can stop that attack. But that’s the only possible way I can be persuaded that enhanced techniques should ever be contemplated for use on a detainee.” Others within the conversation may argue that the ticking time bomb scenario is a red herring – that the proponents of “torture” always turn to that statistically unlikely scenario when they run out of arguments defending their brutal tactics. I think that they’re both right. It is an unquestionably far-fetched scenario wherein an attack is literally pending and an interrogator trained in using enhanced interrogation techniques is sitting across the table from a terrorist with information, which, if disclosed, would stop that attack from taking place. It is an equally far-fetched scenario to imagine that a president faced with such a stark threat would not authorize the full extent of interrogation techniques available to obtain that information. So, yes, everyone’s right. It’s unlikely to happen, and any president would likely authorize the techniques if it did. My question is this: Who gets to define what constitutes a ticking time bomb, and why does it have to be “ticking” to compel us to take extraordinary measures to detect and stop it? Without passing judgment on the validity of their passion on the subject, I would think it a practical matter that anyone who agrees that a president should be empowered to authorize the use of EITs in a ticking time bomb scenario would also believe that EITs may actually work, and that a president’s judgment trumps the moral foundation of their opposition to EITs. I can’t see any way around it. It would then follow that the use of such techniques should be considered within the realm of possibility of any interrogation of any detainee who fits into this ticking time bomb scenario. From my perspective, there are a number of categories of terrorist personnel who would qualify. For example, before the bomb starts ticking, someone’s got to plan it, brief it to the bosses, identify and train the operatives, direct the procurement of the device and/or whatever components are necessary to set it off, arrange for the travel and housing logistics of the operatives, communicate and coordinate with the operatives and management regarding timing, location, and any issues which may develop during the operation, and give the final authority to execute the operation. Were I to be sitting across from the guy known to have planned it, briefed it, and set it in motion, and we were aware that some sort of attack was imminent, I’m fairly confident that most would agree we would be looking at the classic ticking time bomb situation. Those who align themselves in the anti-EIT-unless-it’s-a-ticking-time-bomb column would throw up their hands and say, “Fine, do it.” But what if, in a more likely situation, I was sitting across from the same guy conducting an interrogation without the knowledge that he had planned and set into motion an attack? There are no red alerts, no blinking lights – nothing is ticking. He is, at that moment, simply a high-level detainee with a devastating secret. What would you not want me to do, within the law, to retrieve that information from him – whether or not I had prior knowledge of his intentions? What would be the difference, morally, in my choice of techniques before or after I get word that an attack is imminent and he’s been identified as the planner? In my view there are dozens of potential time bombs in this scenario, none of which are necessarily ticking, all of which can possibly lead me to information about the attack, or, even better, to the planner. The trainer who got captured crossing a border; the bomb-maker we’ve been tracking for months and finally captured; the logistics specialist who arranged for the components and found himself rolled up in a safe house; the money guy who made sure the operatives and suppliers were all adequately financed. None of these individuals would likely know much about the plan other than their specific role and speculation amongst the group, but the successful interrogation of any or all of them could put us on the path to identifying and interdicting both the personnel and, ultimately, the attack – before the bomb starts ticking. Absent effective interrogations on all above, we lose. So while I cringe every time I hear someone from either side bring up the ticking time bomb scenario, I do so not because I believe it to be a silly argument, necessarily, but because I believe the vast majority of “time bombs” we should be focusing on aren’t ticking at all. And sometimes they’re sitting right in front of us. Jason Beale is a pseudonym for a former interrogator with the CIA High Value Detainee interrogation program. Beale would not confirm his participation in the program, but former CIA officials have confirmed to The Weekly Standard that he was a senior interrogator in the CIA interrogation program. Beale initially wrote this piece in November 2014. He tweets @jabeale.

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