In 2005, when I retired from the Air Force, the Pentagon had already spent over four years trying to replace its aging fleet of Eisenhower-era KC-135 airborne refueling tankers with a modern, more capable equivalent. That process is still ongoing.
This month, on their third attempt, Air Force officials are expected to announce the tanker competition winner while under intense scrutiny and crushing political pressure.
I fear that by focusing on dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s of the contracting process, our decision makers have lost sight of the Air Force’s operational needs.
Considering the far-ranging consequences, I am compelled to speak up. Not buying the right tanker will impair the United States’ ability to project military power and deliver humanitarian aid across the globe for the next 50 years.
As I reflect on my own experience as Commander of the United States Transportation Command and the USAF Air Mobility Command beginning immediately after the September 11th attacks, it is clear that our support to combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were significant successes.
When it comes to tankers, that success tells us that flexibility is the name of the game.
Commanders need tankers on the maximum number of airfields with or close to the aircraft they will serve. You want more tankers in the sky, covering a wider geographic area, and offloading more fuel.
Only a small- to medium-sized tanker allows that level of flexibility, a fact confirmed by defense industry analysts at GlobalSecurity.org. The Air Force’s own requirement is for a tanker aircraft: large enough to carry more fuel, cargo, and passengers while small enough to deploy quickly in large numbers from more primitive forward operating bases, delivering fuel directly to the combat zone.
I want to be very clear: Both Boeing and Airbus build great aircraft. There is no debate in my mind about that.
However, Boeing’s tanker, based on its 767 jetliner, much more closely fits the Air Force’s requirements. In contrast, a very large tanker aircraft, similar in size or larger than the current KC-10 Extender or Airbus’s proposed A330 tanker, cannot operate into and out of many smaller, strategically located airfields.
They would also tie up critical, limited parking space needed for fighter or cargo aircraft.
The larger Airbus tanker carries a larger price tag. An independent study by AeroStrategy Management Consulting found that “[t]he EADS A330 aircraft is over 50 percent larger and 25 percent heavier than the Boeing 767; therefore, it consumes substantially more fuel, costs more to perform maintenance and requires more initial upfront investment than the 767.”
According to the study (funded by Boeing), these costs could range from $11 billion to $36 billion over the fleet’s lifecycle.
The Pentagon should also be concerned about a European tanker that will depend on foreign manufacturers for logistics support. Should it disagree with U.S. policy, a foreign country – even an ostensible ally – could withhold critical components essential to keeping aircraft flying and supporting mission objectives.
While fighter aircraft justifiably get most of the attention, U.S. air power is virtually nothing without the behind-the-scenes support delivered by tankers.
When the next crisis hits, tankers will provide the fuel that enables the Air Force to deliver supplies, move troops, and direct air strikes anywhere in the world. However, that capability is predicated on the right mix of medium and large tanker aircraft.
We already own a very large tanker: the KC-10. Based on my experience, a medium-sized tanker, such as Boeing’s, is what the Air Force needs.
It will help maintain America’s role as the dominant global air power well into the future.
Gen. John W. Handy is retired from the U.S. Air Force.
