President Emmanuel Macron of France is determined that the European Union embrace “strategic autonomy” — a policy that sees the EU set its own confident foreign policy course, regardless of what the United States, China, or Russia do.
But while Macron’s idea is winning tentative support from new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, smaller EU and EU-periphery states are learning that EU “strategic autonomy” is more akin to “strategic autocracy.” Unwilling to take action to protect the interests of smaller European democracies, France and Germany are using high-minded theory to put the narrow interests of the few before the core interests of the many.
Two examples stand out.
The first comes from Lithuania, which is now suffering from an escalating Chinese Communist trade war. Infuriated by Lithuania’s decision to open a Taiwan representative office on its territory, China has cut diplomatic relations to a bare minimum and launched a full-scale trade war with Vilnius. Facing the intimidation of its staff, Lithuania closed its Beijing embassy on Thursday. Weaponizing its comparative economic advantage (China’s GDP is 263 times larger than that of Lithuania), China is pressuring European companies to avoid doing business with Lithuania or risk losing access to the Chinese market. Politico reports that German automakers are now seeing parts held at Chinese ports because they were manufactured in Lithuania. This is a clear threat to the democratic values and political sovereignty not just of Lithuania but the EU at large.
Then there’s Ukraine.
Tying a political noose around Ukraine’s neck by pressuring it into the fatally flawed 2015 Minsk II accords, France and Germany now resist efforts to deter a new Russian invasion of the eastern European nation. Matched to a hesitant Biden administration, this European weakness is fueling Vladimir Putin’s confidence that he can get Ukraine’s democratic sovereignty formally and perpetually subordinated to the Kremlin. Again, Putin’s action is an explicit threat to the principle of democratic sovereignty in Europe.
Yet for all Macron and Scholz’s claims to be pursuing realist dialogue with China and Russia, what they are actually doing is appeasing both governments’ aggression. And the leaders of the EU’s two most powerful nations are doing so in a way that utterly guts the necessarily central principle of any credible “strategic autonomy” policy. Namely, the expectation of EU members (Lithuania) and European democratic partners (Ukraine) to find EU “strategic” support.
Yes, the EU has developed a trade countermeasures mechanism to deal with Chinese coercion. But it will take many months, if not years, to start working (if Germany doesn’t veto it). Yes, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock offers a serious voice for European solidarity. And yes, France has now deployed a warship to the Black Sea. But judged where it matters most, the willingness to induce strategic reconsideration on the part of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, the big EU powers won’t take action.
Macron won’t counter Putin’s threat to Ukraine with tough sanction threats against Russian banking interests. He won’t because doing so would risk his export markets. Scholz similarly prefers Nord Stream 2’s cheap gas over Ukraine’s sovereignty. In the same way, Macron won’t risk his Airbus and Chanel sales, nor Scholz his Volkswagen sales, in order to offer an immediate EU trade response to China’s threats to Lithuania. Again, it’s strategic autocracy: the use of strategy in service only of the powerful.
The risks are clear. If the EU is to have any prospect of assuring common action and purpose on the international stage, it must first show a willingness to defend its supposedly most sacred values. There’s a reason Lithuania and Ukraine still prioritize their relationships with the U.S.: The power of Macron’s rhetoric has its limits.
