Liam Karr, an analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, and research Fellow and Middle East expert Zineb Riboua, at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Hudson Institute, spoke to the Washington Examiner about how this change in alliances has led to disaster in the region, now serving as the global center for jihadist violence.

State weakness

The central Sahel is defined by the continent-spanning arid belt that passes through Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Mali and Niger ostensibly rule over large parts of the southern Sahara desert, but state weakness means the actual reach of the central government is limited.

As Liam Karr, an analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, explained, these geographical factors have resulted in unusually weak central governments.

“When you look at Mali in particular, northern Mali is the size of Texas. Mali itself is about double the size of Texas. And just if you look at the size of these states, the militaries, the GDP, at their disposal … It’s very hard for them to exert full control over this,” he said.

The peripheral areas, while much more sparsely populated than the main population centers, are dominated by ethnic groups that feel neglected by the central government, most notably the Tuaregs in northern Mali. The war in the Sahel began in January 2012 as a rebellion from Tuareg mercenaries returning from fighting in Libya.

The inability of the central governments to secure hold over the periphery has made them reliant on foreign patrons, a title historically held by France. Factions within the military have helped fan the flames of anti-French sentiment, which has become the junta’s primary ideological motivation, according to research Fellow and Middle East expert Zineb Riboua, at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Hudson Institute.

The switch from French to Russian patronage came after coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, followed by two in Burkina Faso in 2022, then one in Niger in 2023.

The new junta governments gained much of their legitimacy through their opposition to an increasingly unpopular France and perceived neo-colonialism. The juntas can broadly be characterized as pan-Africanist, according to Riboua, with much of their propaganda being centered on grievances against France.

The Russian model

Russia was pitched as an ally in this anti-colonial struggle. Moscow was more appealing due to its transactional approach, and the juntas evidently thought they could rely on Russian troops for counterterrorism operations while not having to worry about meddling in internal affairs. But while Russian troops have seen some success, Moscow was never positioned to be able to contribute anywhere near as many troops and resources as France and other Western forces.

“These juntas obviously kicked out French troops, U.S. troops in the case of Niger, also UN troops in the case of Mali, and replaced them with a handful of Russian advisers,” Karr said. “That tradeoff just has not worked.” 

Russia’s counterinsurgency tactics, effective when used with the backing of the full Russian military, also haven’t meshed well with the central Sahel states.

“Russia has enabled this kind of brutal counterinsurgency doctrine that Russia also has. We’ve seen it used in places like Chechnya, but it doesn’t translate well to these really big countries where the militaries are not as large, and they can’t use that overwhelming force like Russia did in Chechnya,” Karr continued.

The first Russian troops sent to the Sahel were Wagner mercenaries, which followed an effective model. Its troops, concentrated in Mali, were more willing to “get their hands dirty,” Karr explained, aggressively pursuing jihadists in the barren north where western troops weren’t willing to go.

The absorption of Wagner into the Russian Ministry of Defense has completely changed their posture, rebranded as the Africa Korps. 

“The Russian Ministry of Defense is very bureaucratic, more casualty averse, less active,” Karr explained. “I guess you could say what has happened is that Russian forces have shifted towards becoming a less effective version of Western partner forces.” 

Africa Korps is far less willing to send out expeditions to northern Mali and now expects payment from the junta governments upfront rather than operating in exchange for access to mineral resources. This model is much less appealing to the impoverished governments, which sometimes struggle to pay their own troops.

The political model encouraged by Russia also worsened the juntas’ situations, especially Mali’s, Riboua explained.

“The Russians concentrated power and pushed towards much more centralization in the cities and in the capital, leaving the countryside. But the countryside is where everything plays out,” she said.

As with the counterinsurgency strategy, the approach works in urbanized Russia, but doesn’t translate well into the mostly rural Sahel. Karr concurred, saying the juntas are “very popular” in the capitals, major cities, and urban economic centers of power, more so than the democratic governments they toppled. In rural areas, however, their reputation is radioactive due to the brutal actions of government troops and allied militias.

The government’s unpopularity in the rural areas and propensity for violence against villagers has opened the door for JNIM to cast itself as a more effective protector. In Burkina Faso alone, JNIM is believed to effectively control roughly 40% of the country’s territory. Even in areas not under its direct control, the widespread sympathy in rural areas allows JNIM to set up ambushes along the main roads and dominate the main supply routes into the capitals, especially in Mali.

Its stranglehold over the country became evident last year when the group declared a fuel blockade of Mali’s capital, Bamako. The strategy was highly effective, causing power rationing in the capital and fomenting civil chaos.

Could al Qaeda take control of the Sahel?

In its April 25 surprise assault across Mali, JNIM took advantage of its rural dominance to attack all across the country at once. The government and its Russian allies were able to rally, but not before ceding effective control over the north.

Karr pushed back against the more maximalist predictions made in the first few hours of the assault, claiming that JNIM could take over the country.

“There needs to be a clear distinction made between toppling the government and JNIM taking over, because I think that the government is certainly very shaky, and JNIM could help topple the government,” he said. “They’ve taken over key parts of northern Mali, which this junta has kind of staked its legitimacy to … by proclaiming these symbolic victories in northern Mali.” 

Karr repeatedly stressed the politically savvy nature of JNIM, which has chosen patience and alliance-building over suicidal assaults on government strongholds in the south. Despite its recent victories, and though it’s one of the most powerful terrorist groups in the world, it is still in no place to seize power directly.

“I think that is very, very, very not likely, just because JNIM doesn’t have the legitimacy to do that, especially in southern Mali, and they don’t have the capacity to do that either, given that if you don’t have the legitimacy you need to rule by force, they don’t have nearly the fighters needed to kind of rule with some kind of iron fist,” Karr said.

Riboua painted a slightly more dire picture of the juntas, arguing that the combination of ethnic uprisings and JNIM’s strategic approach has turned the threat to the three countries existential. The trio formed their own security alliance to better combat the jihadist insurgency, but these troops were nowhere to be found in combating JNIM’s offensive last month.

Riboua has eyed a silver lining, believing the chaos beckons for the U.S. to become more involved in the region. She stressed that the anti-French sentiment in the Sahel doesn’t translate into anti-U.S. sentiment.

WAGNER GROUP LEAVING MALI AFTER HEAVY LOSSES BUT RUSSIA’S AFRICA CORPS TO REMAIN

“The government of Bamako is primarily anti-French. They don’t mind actually engaging with the United States,” Riboua said, adding that the two held “very good” talks last year. 

When reached for comment, the Department of State said the U.S. was “committed to promoting regional ownership and cooperation against terrorist threats” in the Sahel.