The quieting down of the war in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah following pressure from Iran and the United States has given the Lebanon-based proxy critical time to regroup and reconstitute itself before the next inevitable round of fighting, experts say.
Hezbollah used the last major ceasefire, in November 2024, to recalibrate itself significantly, reportedly with extensive help from Iran. Though Hezbollah has largely been more effective this year than in the 2024 conflict, the recent fighting in Lebanon was just as imbalanced as two years ago, with thousands of Hezbollah fighters being killed at the cost of a few dozen Israeli military troops. It was given its first limited reprieve with a flimsy ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon in April, then a bigger reprieve this month with a stronger ceasefire as part of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding.
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Reserve Brig. Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, former chief of the research division for the Israel Defense Forces’ military intelligence and current head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, told the Washington Examiner that Hezbollah was, by and large, using the new ceasefire period to rearm and reconstitute itself.
Hezbollah’s primary reason for favoring a ceasefire, Kuperwasser argued, is to “regroup and rearm, that’s the most important thing that they need to do. They are going to use whatever avenue that is available for them to rearm in order to do that, smuggling from here, smuggling from there, self-production, whatever they have in order to produce more weapons.”
Kuperwasser, who served in the Israeli military for 35 years, believes that Hezbollah’s foremost goal is to return to the south along with the civilian population, a possibility repeatedly ruled out by Israel’s high command. Outside of that, it’s focused on regrouping and rearming after suffering major losses, losses which turned the situation “very problematic,” if not critical.
The most ready evidence of Hezbollah’s reconstitution is the scale of Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah fighters, whom the Israeli military claims pose an imminent threat.
Beyond the limited airstrikes on imminent threats, there’s little Israel can do to prevent Hezbollah from rearming itself under the ceasefire, outside of pressuring the Lebanese government to do more. Much of the focus of its negotiations with Beirut has revolved around the disarmament of the group, but nearly all analysts are in agreement that the Lebanese military isn’t capable. Continued pressure could erode Hezbollah’s domestic support, consisting largely of Shiite Lebanese. The group has already seen a loss of support from other segments of Lebanese society as a result of its loss of prestige from defeats at the hands of Israel.
Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanon includes a presence over much of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure built up over decades in the south, limiting its degradation efforts to destroying infrastructure under its control.
This year’s fighting was particularly devastating to Hezbollah due to the scale of Israel’s advances, going the farthest it had gone into Lebanon since withdrawing from the country in 2000. It advanced beyond the Litani River, taking the Crusader-era Beaufort castle. By advancing so far, it was able to dismantle significant swaths of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, something the militant group must spend a great deal of effort rebuilding farther north.
But the changing geostrategic position of Hezbollah has forced it to adapt, even in its rearmament. Once relying on its massive missile arsenal, advances in Israeli intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance have neutered its previous strategy of relying on simultaneous barrages of missiles to overwhelm Israeli missile defenses. Perhaps Hezbollah’s most useful missiles are small, short-range anti-tank guided missiles, which have caused a significant share of Israeli casualties in this year’s conflict.
Israel’s ISR advances, the vast degrading of Hezbollah’s formerly colossal missile arsenal, the loss of its guaranteed Syrian supply route, and the degradation of Iran have pushed the group to redirect its rearmament efforts. It now focuses on restocking small arms ammunition and, critically, drones, especially first-person view drones, Kuperwasser said.
FPV drones, especially the fiber optic variety, have proven themselves to be one of Hezbollah’s most effective weapons. Given their recent debut on the battlefield, Israel hasn’t yet come up with a proper response, often leaving unit commanders to improvise solutions of varying effectiveness, such as mounting netting or cages on vehicles.
Hezbollah first identified drones as a decisive part of future conflicts in late 2024, according to the Alma Research and Education Center, an Israeli think tank. Its analysis of Hezbollah’s operations in this year’s fighting showed the growing centrality of drones in the group’s military tactics and strategy.
Out of 1,163 attacks from Hezbollah from April 17 to June 20, the period when the weak ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was in place, 637 of these, 54.8%, were from drones, with most of these being FPV drones.
“The high proportion of drone and UAV attacks demonstrates that Hezbollah views these systems as a significant operational force multiplier. They provide the organization with a combination of precision, availability, lethality, and intelligence-gathering capabilities,” a report from Alma read, adding that the live feed footage from the drones serves its own purpose as effective propaganda videos.
Many of the drones can be assembled domestically, but Hezbollah is reliant on components from abroad. It has procurement networks in Europe and Lebanon, importing electrical components used in drones.
Alma outlined a recent case in which a businessman was investigated over suspicions he was procuring dual-use technologies for Hezbollah drones. This included motors and electrical components commonly used in civilian items, which he imported from France in several shipments.
This critical supply was largely built up before the war, and it can be assumed that the supply lines were constrained during the war’s height. With the Assad regime in Syria gone, Hezbollah must get its weapons and materials through less secure means.
Part of the shipments, Kuperwasser said, “still comes through Syria, and Syria’s from time to time managed to block the shipments,” while it acquires other weapons and components shipments through “smuggling from the airport, or from the seaports.”
Though the FPV drones are cheap to produce, Kuperwasser suspected that Hezbollah’s supply of the more advanced fiber-optic variety was running low, necessitating a pause for further supplies.
“I would say that the amount of the intensity with which they use the [fiber-optic] FPV drones … is relatively low. They don’t use them too often. If they had more, they probably would use more,” Kuperwasser said.
Many Israeli commanders have argued that the proliferation of drones necessitated an expansion of the war against Hezbollah, arguing for strikes and operations farther north to cripple its drone supply lines.
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Just as critical as the supply of drones are skilled pilots to operate them. Early videos from Hezbollah drones showcased the poor quality of its operators, with the weapons often missing, hitting unimportant targets, or hitting well-armored sections of armored fighting vehicles, thereby negating their effectiveness. Operators quickly improved, and by May 1, the group scored its first confirmed kill of an advanced Israeli Merkava tank.
According to Alma, Israel targeted and killed many of Hezbollah’s skilled drone operators over the past few months. The ceasefire also gives the group time to train more operators to replace these losses.
