The United States keeps warning that Iran-backed militias should not dominate Iraq’s next government. But Washington already knows the truth: Many of the political forces shaping the next Iraqi cabinet are themselves tied to Tehran’s influence network.
That is the contradiction at the center of American policy toward Iraq.
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For years, U.S. officials spoke as if there were two separate forces competing for Iraq’s future: the Iraqi state on one side and Iran-backed militias on the other. That distinction no longer reflects reality. In today’s Iraq, many of the networks aligned with Tehran are no longer operating outside the system. They are embedded inside it.
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Iran’s influence in Iraq has evolved far beyond militias carrying rockets and drones. Tehran now exerts influence through political parties, parliamentary blocs, security institutions, economic networks, border crossings, and state-funded armed factions operating under official government authority.
The Popular Mobilization Forces, originally formed during the war against ISIS, have grown into a massive state-backed institution with an estimated 238,000 registered personnel and billions of dollars in government funding. While not every PMF faction answers directly to Tehran, several of the most powerful groups maintain longstanding ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
What makes this moment especially dangerous is that Iran no longer needs to dominate Iraq only through force. It has spent years building long-term political influence inside the Iraqi state itself.
That reality is shaping the formation of Iraq’s next government.
The Coordination Framework, the dominant Shiite coalition negotiating the next cabinet, includes several factions closely aligned with Tehran-backed political and militia networks. Despite repeated U.S. statements opposing militia domination of the Iraqi state, many of the same actors connected to those networks remain central to negotiations over ministries, security appointments, and economic power.
Even beyond Shiite politics, Iran spent years cultivating relationships across Iraq’s broader political landscape. Tehran built leverage not only with militia commanders but also with businessmen, tribal figures, judges, bureaucrats, and political actors across Kurdish and Sunni communities seeking economic access, political protection, or survival in an increasingly unstable system.
This is why many Iraqis increasingly view U.S. policy as disconnected from realities on the ground. Washington continues speaking about Iraqi sovereignty while simultaneously engaging a political system deeply penetrated by Tehran-aligned interests.
The contradiction is becoming harder to ignore.
On one hand, the United States warns Baghdad against empowering Iran-backed factions. On the other, Washington still treats Iraq as a reliable strategic partner even as many institutions inside the Iraqi state remain heavily influenced by networks aligned with Tehran.
The result is a policy built more on managing instability than confronting its source.
Successive American administrations hoped Iraq would eventually balance itself between Washington and Tehran. Instead, Iran adapted faster than the United States. Rather than relying exclusively on armed coercion, Tehran invested in long-term institutional influence inside political parties, ministries, courts, border economies, and security agencies.
That strategy has worked.
Iran understands something many American officials still hesitate to admit: influence in Iraq is no longer determined only by who controls the streets. It is determined by who influences the institutions.
None of this means Iraq is simply an Iranian colony. Iraqi nationalism remains strong, and millions of Iraqis resent foreign interference, including from Tehran. But nationalism alone cannot reverse years of political penetration and institutional capture.
Nor can vague American warnings without meaningful leverage.
If Washington genuinely wants to limit Iranian influence in Iraq, it must stop pretending the problem exists only at the militia level. The challenge is now political, institutional, and structural.
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The battle over Iraq’s future is no longer simply about militias with weapons. It is about who controls the machinery of the Iraqi state itself.
And right now, Tehran’s allies are positioned dangerously close to the controls.
Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence and Middle East affairs analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official focusing on Iraqi governance, Iranian influence networks, regional security, and U.S. foreign policy. His work has appeared in Middle Eastern, U.S., and other international outlets.
