The U.S.-Israeli strikes have degraded the state apparatus of Iran, but the clerical regime has endured the onslaught. Meanwhile, despite the weakening of the regime, the anti-regime opposition has been unable to seize the moment and spark revolutionary upheaval inside Iran. This scenario underscores a gap in the United States’s strategic calculus pertaining to the internal dynamics of Iran.
Now that this gap has been identified, U.S. policy makers need to understand a fundamental reality that “Iran is more than Persia.” Otherwise, they may overlook the non-Persian ethnicities that constitute about half of Iran’s population and territory, and could become potential allies of the U.S.
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Trump administration attacked Iran at a time when non-kinetic measures alone had proven insufficient to contain Iran. When the trigger was finally pulled, Iran’s defense capabilities crumbled instantly, and it saw expanding the impact of the conflict to third countries as the only recipe to preserve its regime and ambitions.
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This significant deterioration of the regime occurred when the Iranian people had already expressed their profound desire for change by laying down thousands of lives. However, the Iranian opposition appeared unwilling or unable to transform the prevalent anti-regime sentiment into organized resistance during these crucial times.
The reason behind this lack of effectiveness is that, apart from the regime-change slogan, the Iranian opposition is deeply fragmented. The Persian opposition groups are divided on the question of post-ayatollahs political order among monarchists, republicans, and leftists, with many among them insisting on the maintenance of the racial and political dominance of the Persians in Iran.
The demands of the opposition groups belonging to the non-Persian nationalities of Iran range from autonomy to self-determination. They seem unwilling to further tolerate ethnic subjugation and demand concrete guarantees of their national rights.
The refusal of the Persian opposition to recognize the right of non-Persian nationalities to determine their political destiny is a major obstacle in the way of collaboration among the diverse anti-regime forces in Iran.
Among the non-Persian nationalities, the Ahwazi Arabs, the Azeri Turks, the Baloch, and the Kurds are particularly important forces to be considered in any U.S. strategy on Iran. The Arabs inhabit the area of Khuzestan — the heart of the Iranian oil industry — and a considerable part of the coast in the Arabian Gulf. Making up about a quarter of Iran’s population, the Azeris are second to the Persians in terms of population and possess strong potential to strengthen or weaken the regime. The Baloch inhabit the largest contiguous territory after the Persians and own the entire Iranian coast in the Gulf of Oman up to the Strait of Hormuz. The Kurds are politically active, war-ready, and have the experience of collaborating with the United States in Iraq and Syria.
From a resistance perspective, the Baloch in the southeast and the Kurds in the northwest already maintain armed resistance capabilities, and Tehran is already facing low-level insurgencies in these areas. In particular, the Iranian-administered Balochistan has been witnessing a rising tide of socio-political unrest and armed insurgency for the last two decades. Amid U.S.-Iran conflict, the Baloch armed groups continue carrying out fatal attacks against Iranian forces.
In the post-conflict phase, even if the Iranian regime survives, the oppressed nationalities can possibly engage a weakened regime through organized resistance, and with the U.S.’s support, they may gradually shift the power equation to their favor.
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In another scenario, if the regime loses control or collapses and these nationalities achieve autonomy on the lines of Iraq’s Kurdistan region or gain independence, they may prove to be natural allies of the U.S. given that the Baloch and Kurds are themselves secular and pro-democracy nations, the Azeris are Turks culturally associated with Azerbaijan, and the Ahwazi are Arabs who are already the U.S.’s largest allied nation in the Middle East.
Therefore, if the political movements of the marginalized non-Persian nationalities are recognized and incorporated in the U.S. strategy, they can likely become reliable partners of the U.S. under any future arrangement in Iran.
Samand Muhammadshahi is an independent researcher and writer. He holds an M.Phil. in Government and Public Policy. Follow him on X @SamandKhan.
