America doesn’t have an Iran strategy. It has a 50-year illusion

Published July 28, 2026 6:00am ET



Every strategy begins with a political objective. Military force, sanctions, diplomacy, and deterrence are tools. Their purpose is to achieve a political end. When that end remains undefined, tactical successes can accumulate without producing a lasting strategic outcome.

That is the central weakness of the United States’s approach toward Iran.

For decades, Washington has relied on varying combinations of sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, military deterrence, covert operations, and limited strikes. Administrations have differed in emphasis, but the broader approach has remained remarkably consistent: contain the threat, manage escalation, and prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

These policies have imposed real costs on Tehran. They have slowed parts of Iran’s nuclear program and weakened elements of the Revolutionary Guard and its regional proxy network. Recent U.S. and Israeli military operations also demonstrated impressive tactical effectiveness against key military and nuclear assets.

Yet tactical success should not be confused with strategic success.

Nearly five decades after the 1979 revolution, Iran continues to enrich uranium, expand its ballistic missile program, sustain regional proxy networks, and challenge U.S. interests across the Middle East. The tactics have evolved. The regime’s strategic objectives have not.

The possibility that Iran ultimately acquires nuclear weapons can no longer be dismissed. Such an outcome would reshape the regional balance of power, narrow future military options, and make deterrence significantly more dangerous and uncertain for decades to come.

The human rights record is equally alarming. According to Amnesty International, Iran carried out the highest number of recorded executions in the world in 2025 among countries where such figures are publicly available. A strategy centered solely on managing the regime internationally leaves these realities largely untouched.

The underlying question, therefore, remains unanswered: What political outcome is American strategy actually intended to achieve?

If the objective is permanent deterrence of the current regime, policymakers should explain why they believe that approach can realistically deliver long-term regional stability after nearly five decades of recurring confrontation. If the objective is to prevent nuclear proliferation indefinitely while accepting the continuation of the Islamic Republic’s regional behavior, that too should be stated openly.

Neither objective addresses the underlying political reality inside Iran. Millions of Iranians have repeatedly demonstrated against the ruling theocracy despite extraordinary repression. Any long-term strategy that ignores those domestic dynamics is necessarily incomplete.

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Supporting the Iranian people’s aspirations for democratic change does not require assuming that the transition will be simple or risk-free. It requires recognizing that the current strategy has also failed to produce a stable, durable outcome. The choice is not between certainty and uncertainty, but between continuing an approach that has yielded nearly five decades of recurring crises and developing a strategy that acknowledges the central role of Iran’s own society in shaping the country’s future. Among those forces is the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an organized democratic opposition that for decades has articulated a transition framework and a vision for a secular, democratic republic. Its existence challenges the assumption that the only alternatives are the current theocracy or political chaos.

A strategy without a clearly defined political objective is not a strategy at all. Until the United States articulates the political outcome it ultimately seeks in Iran — and aligns its diplomatic, economic, and military tools accordingly — it will continue managing successive crises without moving any closer to resolving them. Tactical successes may delay escalation, but they cannot substitute for strategic clarity.

Dr. Sofey Saidi is a scholar-practitioner specializing in international relations, democratic transitions, and Middle East security.