The Trump administration is once again negotiating over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran said Saturday that an agreement with Oman is close, but that the deal alone would not reopen the waterway. Washington has said it would lift its blockade of Iranian ports if commercial shipping resumes.
The diplomacy captures the central problem of the war. Five months of pressure have inflicted serious damage on Iran, yet Washington has repeatedly had to negotiate to contain the wider consequences. The United States risks spending its own leverage managing fallout from measures meant to strengthen its bargaining position.
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The Trump administration’s logic was straightforward. Military strikes would reduce Iranian capabilities, while sanctions and the blockade would restrict Tehran’s revenues. Rising costs would push Iran toward a settlement favorable to Washington.
For a time, that appeared to work. On June 17, the U.S. and Iran reached an interim agreement to halt the fighting, restore commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and open a 60-day negotiating window. Washington began lifting its naval blockade and offered waivers for Iranian oil exports, while Iran committed to safe passage and holding its nuclear program at the status quo during talks.
The agreement soon collapsed. Washington restored pressure, Iran retaliated, and the two sides returned to escalation.
Pressure on Iran does not stay inside Iran. Tehran cannot match American military power, but geography gives it other tools. Disruption in Hormuz affects shipping and oil prices, while American bases and Gulf partners remain vulnerable to retaliation.
Those costs shape Washington’s choices. Citi recently raised its third-quarter Brent forecast from $75 to $80 because the conflict has lasted longer than expected. Reuters also reported that the Army has used virtually all of its available ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles during the war.
The pattern is familiar. Washington escalates to build leverage. Iran retaliates, and the economic and regional effects spread. The cost of sustaining pressure rises. Washington then seeks a pause or agreement, sometimes easing sanctions or the blockade. When diplomacy fails, the cycle begins again.
Supporters of continued pressure have a fair argument. Iran has violated agreements before, and easing pressure too quickly could teach Tehran that escalation produces concessions. But that case depends on each new round of pressure improving the terms available to Washington. So far, the record does not clearly show that it has.
Time also carries costs for the U.S. Munitions are consumed, regional partners remain exposed, and Tehran learns more about Washington’s limits. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found that only 35% of Americans support the war, while half expect it to make the Middle East more chaotic.
Before another round of escalation, Washington should ask what the additional cost will buy. If further military action can secure durable nuclear restrictions, reliable passage through Hormuz, and greater security for U.S. forces, the Trump administration can make that case. If it simply brings Washington back to talks over the same blockade and shipping routes, America will have spent more without materially improving the deal.
The current negotiations offer a better objective: a better deal at a lower cost. Washington should seek verifiable nuclear limits, reliable commercial navigation, clear consequences for attacks on U.S. forces, and a rapid mechanism for restoring sanctions after violations. An America First diplomacy should use the leverage already created to secure enforceable terms rather than keep paying to recreate the same pressure.
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America has demonstrated its ability to damage Iran. The challenge now is converting that power into a durable political outcome before its leverage loses value.
Washington should stop paying to create pressure and then paying again to contain its consequences.
Travis Lynch is an international relations graduate and independent journalist. His writing focuses on U.S. foreign policy and national security.
