The Islamic Republic of Iran has spent decades building a weapon more subtle than missiles and more difficult to detect than drones. It is an influence machine, a sprawling ecosystem of state media, intelligence services, diplomats, lobbyists, academics, commentators, social media influencers, and political intermediaries designed to shape how Western governments understand Iran. Its objectives are clear: protect the regime, undermine its opponents, fracture Western unity, and create the appearance of legitimate international support for Tehran.
The evidence increasingly points to an ecosystem rather than a handful of eccentric sympathizers. The operation ranges from foreigners invited to Iran on state-sponsored trips to people whose contacts with Iranian officials have brought them into Western political and media circles. The crucial distinction is between documented relationships, allegations, and assumptions. That distinction makes the genuinely documented cases all the more worthy of scrutiny.
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Consider the extraordinary spectacle surrounding the funeral of supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Iranian officials said around 400 foreign bloggers and influencers were brought to Tehran to cover the event. Among those identified were British influencers and media figures Bushra Shaikh and Sakina Dattoo, American commentator Jackson Hinkle, and personalities from several other countries. Shaikh is particularly interesting because reporting has documented her participation in state-sponsored Iranian tours organized through IRIB World Service, including meetings with senior Iranian officials. She subsequently appeared in Tehran for Khamenei’s funeral. These facts establish access and participation. They merit scrutiny while falling short of establishing that she was an agent of the Iranian state.
France provides another revealing example. Bashir Biazar, a former Iranian state media official, was detained and faced expulsion proceedings after French authorities described him as an Iranian influence agent linked to the Islamic Republic’s intelligence services. French authorities also accused him of participating in pressure against Iran International. Those are allegations made by the French authorities and should be treated as such.
Then there is the wider network surrounding the so-called Iran Experts Initiative. Leaked Iranian correspondence has prompted scrutiny of relationships between Iranian officials and Western-based Iran specialists, including names such as Ellie Geranmayeh, Rouzbeh Parsi, Dina Esfandiary, Ali Vaez, and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj. Here again, precision matters. Participation in meetings or communications with Iranian officials does not, by itself, establish that anyone was paid by Tehran, directed by Tehran, or acted as an Iranian agent. Reporting has nevertheless produced evidence that Iranian officials regarded the initiative as a means of developing relationships with influential Western experts and think tanks. That deserves serious examination.
The European Parliament has also experienced uncomfortable questions about foreign influence. Eldar Mamedov, for many years a political adviser to the Socialists and Democrats group, worked extensively on Iran and other foreign policy issues. During the Qatargate investigation, the S&D group suspended him and referred the matter to the Belgian authorities amid allegations of foreign interference. That episode demonstrates precisely why allegations of foreign influence require a transparent investigation rather than assumption. Political sympathy, access to foreign officials, and advocacy of particular policies are legitimate in a democracy. Secret direction, undeclared funding, or intelligence relationships are an entirely different matter.
Another long-standing case concerns Anne Singleton, now Anne Khodabandeh. A 2012 report by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, prepared under a Pentagon-supported program, identified her as an alleged Iranian intelligence ministry recruit. The report stated that she met ministry personnel in Tehran in 2002 and allegedly received training before establishing the Iran-Interlink website. Those allegations have existed publicly for many years. What matters for Western governments is whether claims of this kind can be independently verified and, where appropriate, investigated. The subsequent prominence of Iran-Interlink in campaigns attacking the democratic opposition, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, demonstrates why such questions cannot simply be dismissed.
The pattern is therefore broader than any individual case. At one level sit Iran’s intelligence services, diplomats, state broadcasters, and regime-linked media. At another are Western-based intermediaries, commentators, academics, and influencers who may provide access to audiences that Iranian officials themselves struggle to reach. At a third level are parliaments, think tanks, universities, and media organizations where narratives can acquire legitimacy. The ultimate prize is policy influence. Tehran benefits whenever Western decision-makers conclude that engagement with the regime is preferable to pressure, that sanctions should be relaxed, that Iran’s opposition represents a greater danger than the regime, or that the Islamic Republic can somehow be treated as a normal political actor despite its repression, terrorism, and hostage-taking.
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Western democracies have spent billions protecting their physical infrastructure against Iranian missiles, drones, and cyberattacks. Far less attention has been devoted to the intellectual infrastructure through which Tehran seeks to influence Western perceptions. That imbalance should end. Foreign-sponsored political and media trips should be transparent. Parliamentary meetings involving representatives of hostile states should be properly recorded. Foreign-influence registration requirements should be rigorously enforced. Think tanks and media organizations should disclose relevant funding and institutional relationships. Parliamentary access should carry appropriate scrutiny. Above all, allegations should be investigated impartially, evidence should be distinguished from conjecture, and findings should be published wherever the law permits.
Iran understands the power of influence. Western democracies must learn to recognize it. The greatest danger comes when an authoritarian state succeeds in blurring the distinction between independent analysis and state-sponsored advocacy. A regime that represses its own population, executes dissidents, and projects violence abroad should never be allowed to shape the framework through which Western democracies understand it. The mullahs have built their influence machine patiently. It is time to switch on the lights.
Struan Stevenson was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland (1999-2014), president of the Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Iraq (2009-14), and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004-14). He is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East.
