The European Union has identified major shortfalls in its military capabilities and readiness.
Releasing its first annual assessment of the political bloc’s defense forces, foreign affairs minister Josep Borrell observed that “the EU does not have all the required military capabilities available in order to fulfill (its) level of ambition. European defense suffers from fragmentation, duplication and insufficient operational engagement.” This is a pretty generous assessment. I would suggest Borrell would have been more accurate in saying, “The EU lacks many of the required military capabilities in order to fulfill (its) level of ambition. European defense suffers from fragmentation, duplication, insufficient operational engagement, and a fundamental divorce between investments and aspirations.”
Problem No. 1: Member states are woefully unprepared for a major conflict of the kind that a Russian invasion of Europe would present. The report found that little more than half of the EU’s troops and combat capabilities such as tanks and jets are currently deployable. It also pointed out that EU governments are actually far too reluctant to deploy their forces on operational concerns. As I’ve noted previously, this is particularly obvious in relation to EU naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and northern near-Arctic waters. Unfortunately, rather than issuing hard truths to its member states, this report reflects that most traditional EU approach: Offer many words and few actual commitments.
This is not to say the report is worthless. Putting even the pretense of defense reality to paper, this could be a stepping stone to more serious introspection in the future. It also identifies six areas that would benefit immediately from increased collaboration: “main battle tanks, surface warships, drones, mobility, space access and defense, soldier systems.”
Yet, the ultimate problem here is the most familiar one.
Namely, this report’s indirect underlining of America’s continuing, outsize role in providing for Europe’s defense. In many cases, the capability contrasts between the U.S. military and its European allies are quite stunning. For example, as Europe finally figures out that investing more in drones might be a good idea, the United States is now launching combat drones out of submerged submarines. The simple truth: Unless EU states rise quickly to meet the NATO target expenditures at least 2% of their annual GDPs on defense, and at least 20% of their defense budgets on equipment, the political bloc will be unable to live up to its strategic responsibilities and realize a credible defense posture.
French President Emmanuel Macron can talk all he wants about an independent defense posture outside of the U.S.-led alliance system. But until he’s willing to pump tens of billions of euros more into defense, such aspirations rest on an utterly vacuous foundation. Macron and the EU would take a better example from what the recently departed member state, Britain, is doing with defense spending — namely, increasing it substantially.
This report’s best point is thus that which it leaves implied but unsaid. Considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial appetite, the EU is rather lucky that the U.S. military is guarding its frontiers. That protection should sustain, but only alongside Joe Biden’s demand that Europe bears its share of the defense burden.
