President Trump’s de-certification of the Iran deal was both sensible and courageous. Faced with a chorus of opposition, the president nevertheless persisted and challenged the very deficient Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. However, a bold presidential policy, if mishandled, may still end up not just prolonging the JCPOA in its current form but also damaging America’s credibility.
Historically, Congress has been both the architect and the custodian of American sanctions policy toward Iran. It was Congress that crafted the crippling sanctions against Iran, often in opposition to the Obama White House that then went on to opportunistically claim credit for them. The specter of congressional action hovered over all U.S.-Iran arms control negotiations and helped nudge the Iranians toward whatever compromises they made.
Now that the president has decertified the JCPOA, should Congress do nothing, then its considerable coercive leverage is bound to diminish. It is time for congressional leaders and White House representatives to consider reimposing at least some of the sanctions suspended because of the JCPOA. Credibility is a precious commodity, and once it is discarded, it is hard to retrieve. To sustain its standing and remain a relevant player in the unfolding Iran policy, Congress must respond to the president’s de-certification by passing a punitive sanctions bill.
The Trump administration faces its own set of pitfalls as it moves forward with its Iran policy. In a ritual of diplomacy, Iran is once more blending vociferous rejections of new talks with hints of pragmatism. President Rouhani coyly noted that if the JCPOA is sustained, then “if our friends in the European Union are keen on speaking with us about something, we are happy to talk with them about anything. We speak with them on a daily basis — So, we have no issue with speaking or talking about one [thing or] another.” In a similar act of doublespeak, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif denied seeking a follow-on nuclear agreement while still keeping the door of diplomacy ajar. “Why should we discuss an addendum? If you want to have an addendum, there has to be an addendum on everything.”
The latest Iranian gambit is right out of Rouhani’s diplomatic playbook of 2003, when the Islamist regime was suddenly confronted with a hawkish Bush administration focused on nations that harbor terrorists while seeking weapons of mass destruction. When faced with unpredictable threats, the Islamic Republic usually hunkers down at the negotiating table. An Iran that was clandestinely developing its nuclear infrastructure responded to the Bush challenge by inducing the Europeans into negotiations. The talks lingered, Washington became mired in Iraq, and Iran preserved its essential nuclear assets.
The tentative Iranian signaling on future talks has been echoed by key European leaders. France was always the negotiating partner most skeptical of the JCPOA’s nuclear concessions. Thus, it may not have been much of a surprise when French President Emmanuel Macron recently noted, “Is this agreement enough? No, it is not, given the evolution of the regional situation and increasing pressure that Iran is exerting on the region, and given increased activity by Iran on the ballistic level since the accord.”
Even one of the most vociferous champions of the deal High Representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, stressed that “there are other issues that are out of the scope of the agreement and these issues might be tackled in different formats.” The European leaders are appreciating that the viability of the JCPOA necessitates that America remained tethered to it, and abjuring Washington’s desire to revisit the accord only endangers it. Thus, talks where all the parties bring their grievances to the table maybe the best manner of not just tempering the Trump administration but potentially mitigating some of the most contentious aspects of the JCPOA such as its cascade of sunset clauses.
Although the war fever is once more sweeping the Democratic Party’s resistance and cluttering the op-ed pages, the likely outcome of Trump’s action is not war but negotiations. The cagey rulers of Iran will try to blunt America’s new found resolution by trapping another administration in prolonged and inconclusive talks. The longer the talks drag on, Tehran hopes, the more likely America will be distracted by another international crisis or a domestic dispute. Playing for time has always served the mullahs well.
To avoid the trap of protracted negotiations, the Trump administration must begin by negotiating first with the European allies. The U.S. would reenter the talks only if they are limited in duration and the Europeans would re-impose their own sanctions should the talks falter. It is important to stress to the Europeans that the JCPOA has no standing in U.S. law, as it is not a treaty but an executive agreement rejected by congress. The American commitment to the agreement is contingent on the presidential judgement that it serves U.S. interests. An accord that leaves Iran with a considerable residual enrichment capability, and stipulates that that capability can be industrialized after passage of time, cannot be considered a prudent barrier to proliferation of dangerous nuclear technologies. And all European chancelleries know well that without America, the JCPOA will simply wither away.
Still, given the level of international concern, America’s demands must be modest and sensible. The Trump administration should make clear that it is only seeking to reclaim some of the nuclear mandates that were relinquished by the Obama administration in 2013 when its lust for an agreement overwhelmed its judgement.
The list of American demands should be limited to dispensing with the agreement’s sunset clauses, insisting that Iran cannot develop advanced centrifuges or maintain a large stockpile of enriched uranium at home and that its missiles, which are an indispensable pillar of a nuclear weapons program, must be included in the talks. None of these ideas are radical; they have all been embraced by Europeans in the past and can be the foundation of a transatlantic effort to stem the tide of proliferation in the Middle East.
The de-certification of the agreement constitutes the first and indispensable step in a long path of renegotiating it. Both Congress and the White House must now do their part. Congress has to respond to the president’s move with a sanctions package of its own. And the administration has to engage in delicate task of alliance management while avoiding the likely Iranian ploy of entangling it in endless diplomacy. After years of disunity and working at cross-purposes, the two branches of U.S. government can finally come together in devising an accord that reliably and permanently blocks all of Iran’s path to the bomb.
Ray Takeyh is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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