Muqtada al-Sadr formerly led the Mahdi army, a Shia insurgent force that killed hundreds of U.S. soldiers during the 2003-2009 period in Iraq. But that was then. Today, al-Sadr is the shock victor of last weekend’s Iraqi parliamentary elections.
Running on a ticket with smaller parties, including the secularist Iraqi Communist Party and others, al-Sadr has a strong hand to decide whether Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi will be able to retain power or step down. While al-Sadr has ruled out being the prime minister himself, he can make major demands on whoever wishes to retain that position. That is, unless Haider al-Abadi forms a coalition with former prime minister and Dawa member Nouri al-Maliki to stay in power. This would be damaging for U.S. interests in that it would greatly expand Iranian influence in Baghdad.
So, what are al-Sadr’s key demands? The cleric has abandoned his previous supplication to Iran and has instead adopted the mantle — now quite credible — of Iraqi nationalism. Preaching in favor of multisectarian cooperation, anti-corruption reforms, and opposing what he regards as foreign interference in Iraq’s democracy, al-Sadr has woven his old base of poor Shia urbanites into a broader tent of secularists, Shia nationalists, shoe throwers, and even some Sunnis.
Yet, although al-Sadr has stretched his hand out to Sunnis and their primary patron, Saudi Arabia, his position towards America remains somewhat unclear. On paper, al-Sadr is calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but that rhetoric may reflect electoral campaigning more than a practical governing agenda.
The major U.S. interest with al-Sadr is who he decides should be in the prime minister’s office. The first U.S. preference would be the Iraqi nationalist leader and former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Although his movement performed poorly in the elections, Allawi retains a base of support from Iraqi Sunnis and would allow al-Sadr to burnish his credentials as the great unifier. To make the sums work for a majority however, al-Sadr and Allawi would also likely need the support of the Kurdish bloc and Ammar al-Hakim’s national wisdom movement (a Shia semi-copy of al-Sadr’s movement). While unlikely, this arrangement would give Iraq the chance for a truly multisectarian governing majority.
The alternative U.S. preference would be for al-Sadr to cut a deal with current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and a couple of smaller parties. While al-Abadi is popular, public concerns over corruption have weakened his government. That said, al-Abadi is not a sectarian of the form of Nouri al-Maliki (who split from Abadi to render himself an Iranian puppet) or Shia militia leader Hadi al-Amiri (who is basically an Iranian revolutionary guard officer in disguise).
Fortunately, al-Maliki and al-Amiri are unlikely to receive al-Sadr’s support due to their overt association with Iran and political patronage networks.
Still, the coming coalition negotiations will be very interesting to watch.
