The U.S. and Israeli offensive against the Islamic Republic of Iran continues unabated. So far, however, Iran’s regime is holding on — so much for the rapid internal collapse that many predicted.
“I never know what exactly people mean by internal collapse,” says Arash Azizi, a contributing writer at the Atlantic and expert on Iranian politics. “Does one think the crisis would be so bad, for example, that the rulers will have to just give up and go? This is their job; they’re not simply going to give up.”
Considering Iran’s pyramidal structure, defections from commanding officers could precipitate the regime’s rapid unraveling. The supreme leader makes all the decisions, which trickle down to the clerics and the security apparatus through the Supreme National Security Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Israel and the United States have thus been targeting command and control systems, headquarters, and arms manufacturers to create confusion that they hope neutralizes effective Iranian resistance and creates pressure points toward regime collapse.
“Let us remember that after these rumors first circulated a few months ago, the regime committed the biggest massacre it ever had, right, that didn’t cause any cracks, and now there’s been five days of a war with the U.S. and Israel, and we still don’t really see any meaningful collapse” said Azizi, referring to the slaughter by the regime of thousands of Iranian civilians during an uprising last December and early January.
Perhaps part of the reason defections are still uncommon stems from the Guard’s resilience and capacity to adapt under sustained pressure. Anticipating an attack on its supreme leader, it has delegated to mid-level officers the power to launch independent retaliatory strikes. In turn, this strategy has led to possible miscalculations, such as targeting NATO member Turkey. But it has also ensured the Guard’s continued battlefield capability.
But even if the regime were to weaken or fall, the question of what could realistically replace it remains unresolved. The Iranian opposition has failed to organize itself meaningfully over the years, partly due to the regime’s crackdowns and partly because of divergent views from within. Figures such as former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami are often considered viable alternatives due to their reformist positions. Other names include Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, who headed the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, and Mostafa Tajzadeh, now a political prisoner widely known for his support of free elections. Nevertheless, their internal support remains somewhat weak because younger generations perceive them as part of the old guard.
Iran’s diaspora, comprising about 4 million people who fled after the 1979 Islamic revolution, has made various attempts to unite behind potential alternatives. The diaspora remains a strong force outside the country, given its financial and political leverage in countries such as the U.S. “There remain two problems with the diaspora: the ideological divides remain too deep to produce any meaningful results; and that it has produced zero, and I mean zero, serious organizations over all these years” continued Azizi, referring to the diaspora’s lack of organized structures. This, he adds, severely undermines the diaspora’s credibility, considering just how much time it has wasted.
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The Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is often cited as a potential interim leader. The son of the last shah of Iran has garnered considerable support for his pro-democracy stance and advocacy for a secular Iran. “In and outside Iran, he is a very popular figure in many ways,” explained Azizi. “However, he lacks the organized structure behind him needed to lead a country. How many people work for him right now? Five, maybe 10? If we’re being optimistic, 100? Definitely not enough to lead a solid transition phase.” There are also U.S. intelligence community concerns about how the Guard might handle Pahlavi.
For now, the Iranian diaspora remains a community rich in resources and influence, but poor in the organization required to shape Iran’s political future. Until that gap is bridged, the search for a credible alternative to the Islamic Republic will likely remain unresolved.
Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
