Tokyo

John Kerry’s first visit as secretary of state to Asia this week will be rightly dominated by the heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, where Kim Jong-un’s regime continues to generate headlines around the world with its bluster and brinksmanship. But as important and urgent as the growing threat posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities is, there is another strategic question facing the region, which policymakers from Tokyo to New Delhi will be closely scrutinizing Kerry’s trip for clues about—namely, the approach the Obama administration will adopt during its second term toward Pyongyang’s vastly more powerful neighbor and ally, China.

The Obama administration’s handling of Beijing has undergone a significant evolution since 2009, and in many respects is at the heart of the story of its broader Asia policy. At first, the administration had great expectations for the U.S.-China relationship, signaling new willingness to be respectful of Beijing’s core interests and sensitivities in the hope that this would lead to greater cooperation on global challenges, such as Iran, climate change, and, yes, North Korea. While the White House hardly threw U.S. allies and partners neighboring China under the bus during this period—the first foreign leader Obama greeted in the Oval Office was the Japanese prime minister, and the first state visit he hosted was for the Indian prime minister—there was an unmistakable sense that the new administration was inclined toward a more Sino-centric view of Asia. This sense was deepened by voices in Washington calling for a U.S.-China “G-2” arrangement, and disavowing as retrograde any kind of U.S. role in upholding a regional “balance of power” in Asia—which is to say, a military hedge against Beijing’s rise.