Déjà Vu: Lessons for Iran from the Failed North Korean Nuclear Negotiations

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In the summer of 1994 the Clinton administration faced the gravest crisis on the Korean peninsula since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953. The genesis of the crisis had come in 1992 when Pyongyang concluded an agreement accepting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Subsequent IAEA inspections discovered inconsistencies between Pyongyang’s initial declaration regarding its nuclear program and IAEA findings. Pyongyang then threatened to withdraw from the NPT triggering an international crisis.

Secretary of Defense William Perry recalled in his 1999 memoir Preventive Defense that by June of 1994 “We knew we were poised on the brink of a war that might involve weapons of mass destruction.” The United States had, according to press reports, drawn up plans for an air strike on Pyongyang’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor. The surgical strike was intended to prevent the re-processing of plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel rods which could be used in the construction of an estimated half dozen nuclear weapons. A 1999 CNN report on the crisis quoted Pentagon sources as estimating that such a strike would have led to all-out war with as many as one million casualties.

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