A mistaken shipment of live anthrax may be the tip of the iceberg, as a panel of experts found the U.S. is not prepared for a large-scale chemical attack.
Preliminary findings from a blue ribbon panel studying biodefense show the U.S. doesn’t have the proper infrastructure to prevent or address a bioterror, whether it be through chemical weapons or a pandemic such as the flu. Preparation for chemical attacks has been at the forefront recently after the Department of Defense admitted to shipping active anthrax to labs in 13 states and three countries.
The threat of a chemical attack is in some ways greater now than previously because “the science to synthesize these pathogens and weaponize them is becoming more sophisticated,” Jim Greenwood, a member of the panel, told the Washington Examiner.
The panel, supported by the Hudson Institute think tank, includes former Department of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle. It found it is easier for terrorists to gain access to the equipment to make chemical weapons, thanks to the Internet. The science behind making such weapons is also simplified, Greenwood said.
On the other hand, responsibilities for handling a bioterror attack are scattered among a slew of federal agencies.
“There isn’t one central entity coordinating all of our activities,” said Greenwood, president and CEO of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, a trade group that represents biotech companies.
Another problem is that it is difficult for Congress to be proactive in addressing the issue, he said.
“Congress ends up closing the barn doors after the horses have escaped,” Greenwood noted.
Putting the responsibilities for handling a bioterror attack into one agency, however, could be a bad idea, said Margaret Kosal, an assistant professor at Georgia Tech and a bioterrorism expert.
She said the Department of Defense, which historically has taken on bioterrorism preparation, has a drastically different mission than, say, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
“If one tried to collapse all of the resources and all of the budgets for bioterrorism response into one agency, you would end up less prepared than we are now,” Kosal told the Examiner.
She said a central agency would end up preparing for a general incident and ignore critical details because of a lack of expertise.
The U.S. has made great strides in preparing for a chemical attack since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but the country is “vulnerable due to the nature of chemical attacks,” said bioterror expert Leonard Cole.
To best prepare for an attack, the U.S. needs to commit more funding for basic research into the pathogens and how to best fight them, Cole said.
Greenwood also noted that more incentives are needed to get biotechnology companies interested in making countermeasures and diagnostic screening tools to biological agents such as anthrax.
“These medicines are unique in that the only potential purchaser is the federal government,” he said. “You are not going to go to your corner drug store to fight off anthrax, smallpox or Ebola.”
The panel has not finalized any recommendations, as those will be available when the full report is released in September.
The Food and Drug Administration already expeditiously approves and licenses products that diagnose or treat disease created by dangerous pathogens, the agency said on its website.
While the anthrax shipment may have the public spooked, Cole emphasized the public doesn’t appear to be in any danger.
The anthrax that appears to have been shipped was active but not weaponized, Cole said. An example of weaponized anthrax is the powder found in letters sent to politicians and journalists after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, he added.
