Over half of terrorism-related deaths worldwide occurred in the Sahel in 2025, according to the Global Terrorism Index. The successes of JNIM have transformed Africa into the global epicenter for terrorism.

Pragmatism and gaming local politics

After 25 years of the Global War on Terror, the Al-Qaeda affiliate has taken an entirely new approach to transnational jihad, one that Liam Karr, an analyst for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, described as “revolutionary.” The terrorist group’s strategy can best be characterized as combining selective moderation, gaming local political and ethnic interests, and strategic patience.

“JNIM are very savvy political operators,” Karr said, describing a “franchise model” that establishes different autonomous ethnic subgroups to create a multiethnic coalition.

“But those subgroups have a large degree of autonomy to act within their local context, so that they can respond to the specific local grievances of the predominant ethnic group in that area, and speak their language, literally, but also speak to those grievances,” Karr said.

The success of JNIM in the Central Sahel is particularly surprising due to the region’s historical moderation. JNIM is noticeably conscious of this, selectively holding back Sharia enforcement in more moderate areas to build long-term trust. This mastering of the art of compromise comes in contrast to the ideological rigidity and extremism of the Islamic State group.

“They strike local deals … something to the effect of, ‘if you implement these certain aspects of Sharia, then we’ll drop the military pressure.’ And often, the local leaders or local militants know how to fine-tune those, and they do vary from locality to locality where the group isn’t pushing, chopping off hands, all of this stuff, but more moderate things like dress codes, and they might even let certain localities keep traditional customs,” Karr said. 

There’s been some precedent of Al Qaeda groups adapting to local conditions, such as Al Shabbab in Somalia and the Al Nusra Front in Syria, which eventually rebranded and officially cut ties before seizing power. JNIM has taken this model to another level, even striking some alliances with secular groups such as the Tuareg Azawad Liberation Front, with which it carried out an unprecedented joint offensive on April 25.

Middle East expert Zineb Riboua, at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East of the Hudson Institute, argued that the open tactical alliance between JNIM and the secular Tuareg rebels is one of the most significant long-term impacts of the insurgency, possibly setting a precedent.

The alliance is particularly surprising due to the vast cultural differences between the Tuaregs and an international Salafist jihadist group, especially regarding their views of women.

“The other Tuareg, for example, they don’t see women the same way as JNIM does,” Riboua said. “Women are much more autonomous, much more independent. They have in their families a sort of matriarchal structure. It’s a nomadic culture, and they retained a lot from their pre-Islamic practices that are in direct contradiction with the Salafi teachings of Islam.

JNIM’s proto-state also makes an effort to uphold at least the facade of ethical governance. It funds operations through resource extraction, but also Islamic taxation principles. Zakat, a pillar of Islam requiring Muslims to donate at least 2.5% of their surplus wealth to charitable causes, is wielded by the group as a form of taxation. Analysts have noted that this frequently crosses the line into extortion, but at least has an aura of legitimacy.

Outcompeting ISIS

JNIM’s localized model has proven far superior to the extractive model pursued by the Islamic State’s Sahel Province, which has prioritized its usual shock and brutality over winning over locals. ISSP also hasn’t toned down its transnational aspirations, unlike JNIM, which tailors much of its propaganda to national grievances.

JNIM and ISSP fight each other with similar intensity to that against the junta governments, with JNIM largely emerging victorious. Its activities are now largely restricted to Niger and the tri-border area.

The rise of JNIM and contraction of ISSP can be seen in Armed Conflict Location & Event Data figures, which noted 1,800 ISSP violent actions from 2018 to mid-2025, compared to nearly 9,000 from JNIM over the same period. ACLED noted around 500 violent actions from JNIM in 2018, a yearly total that has nearly doubled in recent years.

Anti-racist jihad

Another strange appeal of JNIM is its stress on Islamic unity as a way to overcome racism. The wars in Mali and Burkina Faso, particularly, are characterized by ethnic feuds, mainly pitting the Tuaregs against the ethnicities further south in the former, and the Fulani pastoralists vs the majority Mossi farmers. Tuareg and Fulani villagers caught in the cycle of indiscriminate retaliatory ethnic violence often flock to JNIM for protection.

Burkina Faso’s ethnic violence has become some of the most brutal, Karr said, as the military is much smaller, so the central government relies on poorly trained pro-government militias.

“When these militias were originally created, even prior to the junta … most of the recruitment took place amongst non-Fulani communities,” Karr said. “And so what this led to was them settling scores, settling ethnic grievances, or the perception that all the Fulani are jihadists.

“When you only have two weeks of training, it’s not like these militias are trained on rules of engagement, or civil-military relations,” he said.

Though JNIM has effectively cast itself as protectors of ethnic minorities against racist attacks, Karr also pointed out that this has led to an incentive structure that encourages the group to foment ethnic violence, which it often will.

Military innovation

While the political strategy pursued by JNIM has produced major gains, the conflict in the Central Sahel still boils down to an armed clash, and in warfighting ability, JNIM has likewise emerged as the most capable force.

JNIM relies heavily on ambushes, taking advantage of its dominance of the countries’ rural areas.

With the help of their Russian allies, the junta government has “concentrated power and pushed towards much more centralization in the cities and in the capital, leaving the countryside. But the countryside is where everything plays out,” Riboua said.

The approach works in urbanized Russia, but doesn’t translate well into the mostly rural Sahel. Karr concurred, saying the junta is “very popular” in the capitals, major cities, and urban economic centers of power, more so than the democratic governments they toppled. In rural areas, however, their popularity is at rock bottom, largely due to their brutal counter-insurgency practices.

The government’s unpopularity in the rural areas and propensity for violence against villagers has opened the door for JNIM to cast itself as a more effective protector. In Burkina Faso alone, JNIM is believed to effectively control roughly 40% of the country’s territory. Control of rural areas translates into control of the cities’ supply lines. Last year, it announced a fuel blockade of Mali’s capital, Bamako, paralyzing the city.

Lt.-Col. of the Ordnance Service in the Portuguese Army Jorge Balula wrote in his book Jihad in the Dust about how JNIM has made liberal use of advanced infiltration, making use of captured soldiers’ uniforms and weapons. Disguised as junta soldiers, jihadists carry out advanced reconnaissance of their targets ahead of attacks, but also use the ruse of a way to erode trust among civilians.

“Civilians—mistaking disguised fighters for allies—may unwittingly provide information or access, only to face abductions or coercion later… This deepens human fear and causes community distrust, leading to defections where locals, caught in the crossfire, withdraw support from state forces or even align with JNIM for perceived protection,” Balula wrote.

JNIM has developed its own version of combined arms tactics, adopting innovative tactics suited for the environmental conditions of the Central Sahel. The group makes heavy use of motorcycles, becoming a type of modern cavalry best suited for the modern battlefield. Its attacks on military bases or strongpoints are often preceded by suicide car or truck bombings, sowing chaos and allowing openings for fighters.

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Over the past year, best seen in the April 25 offensive, JNIM has also begun using First Person View drones, a weapon revolutionized in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Its advanced tactics, combined with ideological fanaticism, make JNIM more than a match for demoralized junta fighters. While inferior to Russian Africa Corps fighters, these are too few in number and scattered across too wide an area to effectively combat the swift-moving JNIM fighters.