TRUMP’S IRAN WAR IS PREVENTING A NORTH KOREA CRISIS

There are two errors that the Trump administration could potentially commit in attacking Iran. The first is that the administration attacks Iran when it neither possesses a nuclear weapon nor is on the precipice of developing one. The second is that the administration fails to attack Iran when it possesses nuclear capabilities and fully intends to deploy them. Sound public policy counsels in favor of embarking upon that course of action that minimizes the social cost of being wrong. Committing the second error carries the far greater social cost.

Despite the opposition to Epic Fury, a recent Rasmussen poll reveals that 84% of likely voters agree that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. How can this poll and the Pew Research findings be reconciled? A plausible explanation is that Americans writ large do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. But for the majority of them, the price, as measured in terms of military engagement and the associated economic collateral damage, exceeds their maximum willingness to pay.

As both an entrepreneur and a politician, Trump has always been a risk-taker — go big or go home. A successful operation against Iran increases the prospects that Republicans hold the House in the midterm elections. A failed operation against Iran ensures that the Republicans will lose the House, but that was the likely outcome anyway. Hence, Trump’s strategy to swing for the fences and attack Iran can seemingly be rationalized on both public policy and political grounds.

The president is betting that the Iranian operation will be successfully completed long before November. This will result in a precipitous drop in gasoline prices, the reopening of shipping channels, and the stabilization of financial markets. The president relishes the opportunity to once and for all solve the “Iran problem.” In light of the Abraham Accords, he views Iran as one of the last remaining obstacles to achieving peace in the Middle East.

Some have questioned the wisdom of going beyond destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which the administration supposedly accomplished last summer with Operation Midnight Hammer, to bring about regime change — and these are valid concerns. The enduring lesson from decades of conflict in the Middle East is that evil has a very deep bench in this part of the world. There can be no guarantee that the leadership that prevails in Iran’s extant political power struggle will be any more reasonable than the previous one.

Trump has been roundly criticized by several high-profile MAGA supporters for taking military action that he promised to avoid during his 2024 presidential campaign. The president may be a non-interventionist by default, but he refuses to be boxed in by an unwavering allegiance to a strict ideology. Strategies and tactics change, and they should, as conditions on the ground change. 

AS IRAN MULLS US ONE-PAGE PROPOSAL, TRUMP SAYS ‘IT’S VERY POSSIBLE THAT WE’LL MAKE A DEAL.’

Finally, it is conceivable that the president initiated a limited military action in Iran to showcase America’s military might and thereby reduce the likelihood of a much broader conflict with the world’s superpowers. He can lay claim that military action should be avoided. But if this is not possible, the second-best course of action is to engage in a smaller war to avoid the bigger one.

Time will tell, sooner rather than later, whether Trump is a brilliant strategist or too clever by half.

Dennis L. Weisman, Ph.D. is a Professor Emeritus of Economics at Kansas State University.