Ukraine is facing increasing Western pressure to concede territory as part of a formal ceasefire and/or peace agreement with Russia.
Pushing for such compromises now is folly.
This is not to say that many of those arguing for Ukraine’s concessions aren’t well-intentioned. They see the devastating loss of Ukrainian life, the increasingly significant impact of the war on global food and energy markets, and Russia’s intransigence in remaining committed to the war. This intransigence is real and should not be underestimated. Although little noticed, for example, Russia quietly increased the age cap for conscription to 40 this week. For Vladimir Putin, who increasingly appears to have some form of illness, Ukraine has long been a matter of destiny.
Nevertheless, some in favor of Ukraine’s immediate concessions have less credible arguments. The New York Times editorial board illustrates this group, offering Ukraine the utterly contradictory advice that it is “they who must decide what an end to the war might look like,” then immediately adding that “it will be Ukrainian leaders who will have to make the painful territorial decisions that any compromise will demand.” Question: If it is Ukraine that “must decide what an end to the war might look like,” why will Ukraine “have to make” territorial concessions?
Similarly, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger this week told the Davos forum that “negotiations need to begin in the next two months before it creates upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome. Ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante.”
This is delusional. It misreads Ukraine’s conception of where the war now stands, and it misunderstands Putin’s psychology and associated strategy.
For a start, Russian confidence is growing. The Kremlin’s forces have regained some offensive momentum in some, but not all, areas of eastern Ukraine. They hope to compress the Donbas salient. As I noted in April, this may force Ukraine into at least a temporary tactical withdrawal. And while allowing greater opportunity for an overstretch of vulnerable Russian lines of communication, any withdrawal will obviously encourage Russia to press its advance. Putin’s ultimate objective with his eastern offensive may rest with encircling the city of Dnipro on Ukraine’s bisecting Dnieper River.
It is hard to see any circumstances, however, under which Ukraine would accept a Russian victory that includes this territory. Instead, President Volodymyr Zelensky and his advisers clearly believe that time is on their side over the longer term. That if Ukraine continues to drain the Russian army’s combat power, deplete Russia’s munition stocks, and impose increasingly serious costs on Russian logistics and morale, Putin will hit a dead end. Ukraine is also banking on international sanctions and political isolation to achieve a gradual decline in Russia’s economic foundations. Evincing as much, a senior Russian minister this week noted that domestic supply chains have essentially imploded.
Neither should we obsess over Moscow’s psychology while negating that of Kyiv. Ukraine’s formidable resolve to fight has been boosted both by rage at the suffering of its people and by the growing expectation that it can achieve strategic victory. Namely, the total dislocation of Russian forces.
For Kissinger and company, there’s a broader misunderstanding as to the nature of Russian security strategy. While Putin is highly ambitious and ideologically driven in Ukraine, there is no evidence he is insane (even as his physical and psychological health may be declining). As with any nation, Russian security strategy is a product of its leaders and culture. And Russian national security culture is vested with a deep disdain for the West and an inherent impulse for aggressive risk-taking. The Russians respect honest confrontation and despise hesitant equivocation.
Our understanding of that truth matters because if the West now pressures Ukraine to make concessions to Russia, it will only encourage Russia to escalate its demands without commensurate, verifiable concessions to match. In Ukraine since 2014, and Syria since 2015, Russia has relentlessly proven that it views ceasefires as a flexible means to exploit conditions in Ukraine and manipulate global political initiatives. Put simply, the only credible ceasefire and eventual peace deal in Ukraine will be one that to some degree is imposed upon Russia. In turn, the West should clarify two other considerations for the Kremlin.
First, that while it does not seek direct military conflict with Russia, it will escalate its support for Ukraine’s defense. This must include anti-ship and multiple launch rocket systems that the Biden administration and European allies have been too risk-averse to providing up until now (Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin deserves credit for pushing hard to correct this error). The sooner Russia realizes it is stuck in a no-win situation, the sooner it will come to the table in better faith.
Second, the United States must also refuse to cede to Russian nuclear threats. Putin and his security kingpin, Nikolai Patrushev, might be very tough adversaries, but they are not crazy. They are aware — so are the Russian military officers who would have to effect any nuclear order — that nuclear confrontation with the U.S. would pose an existential threat to Russia. While the worst scenario of a full nuclear exchange with the U.S. would be a catastrophe for the U.S., unlike for Russia, it would be unlikely to threaten the U.S.’s existence as a sovereign entity. Russian leaders know this and, if reminded of its credible potential, are deterred against actions that risk it. Don’t take my word for it; take the history of the Cold War.
Top line: Peace will only be morally and strategically possible when Ukraine believes a suspension of hostilities is in its interests and when Russia realizes that it must commit to such a peace or face far greater loss.
